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Gains from Trade and Environmental Policy under
Imperfect Competition and Pollution from Transport1
Luc Soete and Thomas Ziesemer
1. Introduction
The relationship between the environment and international trade has been investigated in the
framework of several international trade models that have been extended to contain the factor
environmental pollution. The Ricardian trade model has been used by Pethig (1976) and the
Heckscher-Ohlin model has been used in different ways by Pethig (1976), McGuire (1982)
and Merrifield (1988). Conrad (1993) applied the Cournot-Brander-Spencer model and
Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993) have applied the Horstmann-Markusen model. In this
paper we apply the Chamberlin-Krugman model.
We analyze the environmental transport costs of international trade and illustrate how
they reduce the conventional gains from trade if their is no environmental policy reducing
pollution in the trading countries. The motivation stems from the fact that in economic theory
pollution is assumed to come from production, consumption or the use of capital. However,
it is commonly pointed out in the business press that one of the largest users of energy is
transport, which is using roughly one third of energy in the OECD as industry and
residential/commercial does. However, the share of transport is increasing, whereas that of
the other two users is decreasing. On average, international transportation requires larger
travel distances than national transportation. International trade therefore inevitably contributes
to pollution because it increases energy use. Pollution from transport, however, has not been
analyzed in the literature on international trade and the environment.
Moreover, we analyze the effects of technical progress and environmental taxes on
prices of goods and pollution. We do so from the point of view of a market approach to
1This paper is a revised version of MERIT Research
Memorandum 92-022, September 1992. It has been discussed at the
Free University of Berlin, the ’Jahrestagung des Vereins für
Socialpolitik’ in Münster 1993 and at the conference from which
the current volume has originated. We are grateful for all
comments received by the audience of these presentations and
especially to Theon van Dijk, Karin Kamp and Rene Kemp.
internalization and from the point of view of optimal taxation.
To demonstrate the basic line of thought we add transport costs and pollution (CO1,2,
SO2, smoke, NOx) to a model of monopolistic competition and increasing returns first
developed by Krugman (1979). In this model, the gains from trade consist in the first instance
of the higher diversity of consumption goods supplied and the greater use of increasing
returns to production. By adding transport costs as man-hours needed for national and
international distances rather than iceberg cost as in Krugman (1983), we can analyze within
a comparative static framework several forms of technical progress in the transport sector.
Furthermore, we make pollution depend explicitly on transport rather than on production.
Dogs, Ellwanger and Platz (1991) estimate the external costs of lorries to be 1/6 of transport
revenues. In the model developed below transporters will have to pay for pollution rights
bought from households or will have to pay taxes which are paid to households.
In the literature the result that conventional gains from trade may be outweighed by
losses from increased pollution has been illustrated in perfectly competitive models by Pethig
(1976) and Siebert (1977) with pollution directly related to output production. We re-establish
these results in an imperfectly competitive model with pollution related to transport. One
reason for doing so is closely related to the fact that specialisation and mobility of goods and
activities are generally considered costless both in trade and growth models. Specialisation,
whether within the national boundaries of a country or at the broader international level, is
of course at the core of growth primarily because of the improved allocation of resources and
the reaping of advantages associated with increasing returns to scale. It is precisely this latter
feature which has been brought to the forefront in both "new" trade theory (Krugman, 1981)
and "new" growth theory (Judd, 1985). However, the reaping of such scale advantages that
might also involve scale advantages in reducing emissions in production, ignores the impact
of increased transport flows, and in particular the impact on pollution from such increased
flows.
The use of a monopolistic framework rather than a perfectly competitive one on the
other hand, means that "Pigovian policy" will generally not be optimal. As Buchanan (1969)
and many others after him have pointed out, such a policy may increase the inefficiencies
from monopolistic behaviour. Second-best optimum policy results have been derived within
a partial equilibrium setting by Lee (1975), Barnett (1980) and Conrad (1993). In this paper,
we provide a general equilibrium comparison of equilibrium and optimal policies under
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monopolistic conditions.
A second difference from first-best models is the existence in imperfectly competitive
models of an endogenous number of firms. Until now only Markusen, Morey and Olewiler
(1993) discussed the effects of environmental policy on the number of non-competitive firms,
applying the Horstmann-Markusen model. They do so under the rather restrictive assumption
that fixed costs are very high relative to demand so that at most there are three firms
producing in the economy. The welfare effect of closing one firm may then be, not
surprisingly, large. We discuss the situation of many firms where the closing of one is a
marginal event. In other words, we take an intermediate position between that of Markusen,
Morey and Olewiler (1993) and the perfectly competitive one.
In comparison with the other imperfect competition models, the Krugman model has
some interesting empirical features which make it more relevant than the other models.
Firstly, it considers differentiated goods, a property that it shares with the model by
Markusen, Morey and Olewiler, whereas other models consider homogeneous goods, which
is much less realistic. Secondly, the Krugman model has zero profits which is much more
realistic than positive profits because profits tend to vanish at the two-digit level (see
Morisson 1989, for the US, Canada and Japan and Katz and Summers 1989, for US data and
Maks 1994, for data for the Netherlands) and therefore may be occasionally relevant, of
course, on the firm level but less so for general equilibrium considerations. This also casts
some doubts on the relevance of profit shifting models simply because profits are largely
absent. Thirdly, models mentioned above have linear demand curves whereas the empirical
estimates of demand functions show that log-linear specifications are the best; they imply
constant elasticity demand functions as does the love-of-variety utility function of the
Krugman model.
Finally, a crucial feature of the Krugman model is the symmetry assumption of having
two identical countries. In our case this implies that both countries have the same policy.
Therefore there can be no terms of trade effects as in Siebert (1979) and Krutilla (1991). The
symmetry assumption and the endogenous number of firms seems to be a realistic way to
capture the EU attitude of the EU to not take the initiative in CO2 policy because of possible
negative effects on international competitiveness. One way of interpreting the model is that
the EU and the rest of the world are assumed to have successfully negotiated to undertake
identical policies. The model then reflects the effects of policy on international
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competitiveness.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we extend the Krugman model
to include a transport sector, pollution and pollution payments. Section 3 contains the decision
of the household and those of producers and transporters. In section 4 the model is solved
for exogenous taxes on or prices for pollution rights. This solution is compared to that of
autarky in section 5. The gains from trade result is derived in section 6. The equilibrium
solution for the existence of markets for pollution rights is presented in section 7 and the
solution for optimal taxes in section 8. Section 9 summarizes and concludes.
2. The model
We consider an economy that has two types of resources: labour L and the environment E.
Households appreciate consumption ci of n varieties produced at home and of n* varietiesc˜j
imported and are assumed to have - for the mere sake of simplicity - additively separable
preferences V from the environment. The utility function is then similar to the Dixit-Stiglitz
function representing "love-of-variety" preferences:
Production xi of home products has labour requirements li with:
(1)n
1
c
θ
i
n n
n 1
c˜
θ
j V (E) , θ < 1
The distance to home markets can be measured as the man hours per lorry trip (for simplicity
(2)li α β xi i 1,...,n
we do not model the capital embodied in cars, trains etc. explicitly here) at a certain speed;
to home consumers it is h and to the national border it is f. We assume that transport is taken
over by a foreign partner at the border while home transporters carry imports with them on
their way back home. A person per truck drives the distance f to a foreign country with
exported goods, then f-h back to home markets with imported goods and then the distance
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h to the place of production with an empty car (or takes waste back to the producers)2. A
special case is when consumers live near production making h = 0. Given that each trip by
a lorry requires one driver, and one truck with a certain capacity, the number of international
transports t is:
where xi - ci is the export of variant i and K is the capacity of one truck, and the labour
(3)n ( xi ci )/K t
demand required is t•f. For a transport to home markets the number of national transports u
is:
and the corresponding labour demand u•h.3 Moreover, transporters need labour hours for
(4)n ci / K u
(un-)loading cars, d, per unit produced. Of course, riding back with imported goods or with
an empty lorry is part of the costs and therefore tf+uh is multiplied by factor 2. An
exceptional case may be when h > f if, e.g., a Dutch farmer from some region in the
Netherlands has lower distance to German markets than German farmers from far distanced
regions have to the same German markets. However, we will only consider here symmetric
cases when f≥h.
The environment can be thought of as having some natural level that is pollutedE
proportional to transport hours with pollution coefficient v:
Labour market equilibrium requires that labour demand for output production, nli , for
(5)E E v 2 ( tf uh )
transport 2(tf + uh) and loading, ndxi, equals labour supply L:
2 Alternatively one could assume that households transport from the firm to their home
themselves, 2h, and imported goods are transported by the transport sector to the location of
the firm, 2g, and from the firm to the households by the latter, 2h again. Defining f = g + h
implies the same modelling as done below.
3We ignore integer problems in the number of transports in (3) and (4).
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(6)n li 2 t f 2 u h n d xi L 0
For the resulting hours of pollution the transport firm pays a tax or a price, s, for pollution
rights owned by the households of, in sum
to households. Given (5) households thus receive a payment of
s2 ( tf uh )
s 2 ( tf uh ) s ( E E )/v
3. The decisions of the households and the producers
The Lagrange function for the problem of households - with pi and representing pricesp˜j
of home and foreign goods respectively and w the wage rate - is:
The first-order conditions for the problem of the household are:
Max
ci,c˜j, λ, E
U
n
i
c
θ
i
n n
n 1
c˜
θ
j V(E) λ{wL
n
1
pi ci
n n
n 1
p˜ j c˜j s (E E)/v}
(10) delivers the desired level of environmental quality, E. If the desired E equals the actual
(7)δU / δci θc θ 1i λpi 0 i 1,.....,n
(8)δ U / δ c˜j θ c˜ θ 1j λ p˜j 0 j n 1,...,n n
(9)δU / δλ wL
n
1
pici
n n
n 1
p˜jc˜j s (E E)/v 0
(10)δ U / δ E V λ s/v ≤ 0 (δ U/ δ E) E 0
one, the corresponding s will be called equilibrium tax or equilibrium price for pollution
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rights. The inequality results from the possibility that households may want to sell all
pollution rights E. Whether or not this will be the case will depend on the specification of the
utility function V. We do not consider the other corner solution E = because no pollutionE
implies no transport and therefore zero consumption which cannot be an equilibrium situation.
From (7) and (8), we find the equality of the marginal rate of substitution and relative prices:
and therefore:
c
θ 1
i / c˜
θ 1
j pi / p˜j
The computation of the price elasticity of demand for a large number of goods can be
(11)p˜jc θ 1i / c˜ θ 1j pi
approximated by
Within the simple model assumed here, producer prices, the terms in square brackets
δ pi / δ ci (ci / pi) θ 1
in the profit function below, are equal to consumer prices, p, net of transportation costs4. If
external costs are 20% of transport costs or revenues, the Pigovian value of s is s = 0.2w
because transport costs consist only of wages in our simple model. The profit function of the
monopolist is:
where xi - ci = because of the assumption that countries are identical and that goods enter
pii [pi(ci) dw (w s)2h/K] ci [p˜j(c˜j) dw (w s)2f/K](xi ci)
{wα wβ(ci xi ci)}
c˜j
the utility functions symmetrically.
Maximizing the profit function with respect to ci and yields:c˜j
4The relationship between the monopolist and the transporter is modelled in appendix A,
which is available upon request.
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δ pi / δci pi ci [pi (ci) d w (w s) 2h /K] w β 0
δ pi / δ c˜j p˜j c˜j [p˜j (c˜j) dw (w s)2f /K] w β 0
4. Solution of the model
Using the fact that the price elasticity is θ-1 and setting w = 1 the previous equations can be
solved and yield:
From these expressions for prices we find proposition 1.
pi [β d (1 s) 2h / K]/θ ≡ η / θ
p˜j [β d (1 s) 2f / K]/θ ≡ ϕ / θ
PROPOSITION 1: Technical progress in variable labour inputs, dβ, in (un-) loading, dd <
0, in capacity, dK > 0, and in speed of driving, dh, df < 0, all considered at constant
pollution v per hour, reduces the prices of home and foreign goods and therefore increases
real wages.
As the terms in square brackets in the equations above differ only in the distances h
and f, we henceforth use and to abbreviate them. The result for pi differs from thatη ϕ
in Krugman (1983) because we have introduced transport costs for national trade. In our
model the price ratio contains three cost terms whereas under Krugman’s iceberg costs
assumption, it equals the share of not melting away during transport. The difference between
the two price equations mirrors the difference between h and f. Another essential result is
stated in proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: Payments for the environment drive prices up and real wages down. As
a consequence the monopolistic inefficiency, defined as the deviation of marginal cost (β),
plus transport costs from prices, increases.
As has been pointed out by Buchanan (1969), who derived a similar result in a partial
equilibrium model, this has to be taken into account when looking for an optimal subsidy as
we do below in section 8. However, as transport costs are crucial here we find the following
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result;
PROPOSITION 3: Prices of imported and exported goods are more strongly affected by
environmental taxes than by prices of domestic goods because international transport
differences are larger than national ones for f > h.
Therefore the relative price of goods produced and consumed at home and traded
goods will decrease: . This effect on relative prices induced by s will ofδ(η / ϕ)/δs < 0
course vanish if f = h, a case discussed below. Setting w = 1 and using (11) one can solve
for relative quantities (see appendix B, 1.)
The most important effect of environmental taxes or prices follows from this equation and is
(11’)c˜j / ci (η / ϕ)1/(1 θ)
summarized in the following crucial proposition;
PROPOSITION 4: Because internationally traded goods are affected more strongly than
nationally traded goods, , an increase in environmental tax/price leads toδ(η/ϕ)/δs < 0
the substitution of internationally traded goods by domestically traded goods .c˜j ci
As imported and exported goods are transported along ways of identical length, taxes
on transport do not influence the terms of trade as, by assumption, both countries impose the
same tax rate. By contrast, in models with pollution from consumption or production they do
effect the terms of trade (see Siebert, 1979, and Krutilla, 1991). Consequently, our model
emphasizes the substitution between domestic and international trade instead of terms of trade
effects.
As discussed above, technical progress in transport may decrease h and f and increase
K. This leads to the following proposition;
PROPOSITION 5: Decreasing h (f) shifts consumption to domestic (foreign) goods.
Increasing K has a stronger effect on the prices of foreign goods and shifts consumption to
them because f is larger than h.
Thus, part of the environmental gains from increasing K are lost through substitution.
The zero-profit condition requires:
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The last two equations could be solved for ci and . Replacing pi, pj and cj in the zero
[pi dw (w s) 2h / K] ci [p˜j dw (w s) 2f / K] c˜j {w α w β (ci c˜j)} 0
c˜j
profit equation and using the abbreviations mentioned above yields (see appendix B, 2.):
c
f
i
[α θ/(1 θ)]/ϕ
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
The upper index f stands for "free trade". The first term represents domestic consumption of
c˜
f
j
[ α θ
1 θ
/ϕ ] (η/ϕ ) 1/(θ 1)
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
domestically produced goods. The second terms represents export quantities which is equal
to the amount of domestic consumption of foreign goods under the assumption of two
identical countries. For f = h, prices of traded and domestic goods are identical and the
increase of ϕ through an increase of s will reduce the consumption of both goods by the same
amount. As f > h induces a substitution of for ci, it is clear that whereasc˜j δc˜j / δs < 0
the substitution effect may prevent ci from falling if s increases. With these solutions for
prices and quantities we can now go back to equation (6) and solve for n, the number of
domestically produced varieties. Insertion of (2) and the definitions of t, u and xi into (6) after
collecting c-terms and insertion of the free trade solutions for the c-terms yields (see appendix
B, 3.):
As the effect of the c-terms on nf is negative, the effect of s on nf, is:
n f [ci (β 2h / K d) α c˜j (β 2f / K d)] 1 L


{[α θ / (1 θ)]/ϕ} {(β 2h / K d) (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1) (β 2f / K d))
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
α
1
L
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where the latter condition is fulfilled if f - h is sufficiently small, as discussed above. Whereas
δ n f / δ s (δ n / δ ci) (δ ci / δ s) (δn / δ c˜j) (δ c˜j / δs) > 0 if δ ci / δs < 0
in comparative advantage models the export structure may be reversed if exporters are heavily
taxed by one country only (see Pethig, 1976 and Siebert 1977, 1979 on the theory and
Grossman/Krueger 1991 on the empirics) this, of course, cannot be the case in a symmetric
model whereby the pollution of transport is taxed by both countries. Instead we get the
following proposition;
PROPOSITION 6: Both countries will produce a higher number of varieties, at least if
national and international transport differences are sufficiently small. Bringing the
environmental costs correctly into the cost calculations through taxes and transferring the tax
revenues to households increases variety and decreases quantity.
This is achieved through the revenues from transport and pollution due to taxation. For
f = h the reduction in pollution is5 :
The following proposition follows from this inequality;
δ {[vn (ci h c˜j f) / K]} / δ s 4 f
2 L θ v (θ 1)
{β k dk 2f [s (θ 1) 1]}2 < 0
PROPOSITION 7: The increase in the number of varieties, induced by a higher tax rate, is
smaller than the change in the quantities because new varieties require fixed labourci , c˜j
inputs α. Therefore the induced substitution of quantity for variety and of international for
domestic transport reduce pollution.
Using the definitions of ϕ and η one can now show6 that without environmental
policy, s = 0:
Without environmental policy, s = 0, transport costs have no influence on the number of
n f (1 θ) L / α
5This result can be obtained by differentiation of the left-hand side with respect to n, ci,
c*j, and differentiating them with respect to the environmental tax/prices according to the parts
of the solution derived above.
6Without environmental policy we have η = β + 2h/K +d, and ϕ = β + 2f/K + d.
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varieties. The corresponding solution for n* would be determined in the foreign countries’
symmetric model. With the solution for n one can go back to (5) and solve for - E, theE
environmental costs, using (3) and (4) and the solutions for consumption of domestic and
foreign goods. Before doing that we compute the solution of the model for autarky which we
will subsequently need to calculate the gains from trade.
5. The solution for autarky
As n* is given, free trade could only be identical to autarky if would go be zero in thec˜j
utility function. This in turn can only be the case if ϕ goes to infinity which would require
to have infinitely high prices . Thus, unlike comparative advantage models, autarkyp˜j
cannot be thought of as a special case of trade where the terms of trade equal autarky prices.
In autarky we have ci = xi , 0 = n* = t = and does not exist. The zero profitc˜j p˜j
condition solved for ci yields (see appendix B, 4.):
The upper index ’a’ stands for ’autarky’. From the definition of η it is clear that the following
c
a
i α θ / [η (1 θ)]
proposition can be derived.
PROPOSITION 8: Environmental payments reduce the quantity consumed of each variety
whereas technical progress in transport, dh < 0, and in capacity dK > 0, increase it.
Modifying (6), solving for n and inserting the solution of ci yields (see appendix B,
5.)
If there were no environmental payments (s = 0) the solution for the number of varieties in
n a L (1 θ)

[β d (1 s) 2h / K]
[β d (1 s) 2h / K] θ s 2h / K /α
autarky would be that of the Krugman model without transport costs. Differentiating na with
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respect to the domestic transport distance, h, and the environmental payment, s, yields the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 9: (a) For any environmental payment s > 0, an increase in national
transport costs, dh > 0, increases the number of varieties available under autarky. (b)
Environmental payments increase the autarkic number of firms because household income
increases proportionally to the environment being taxed or "rented out" to the transport firm.
This holds because the rebatement of tax revenues and the decreased quantity
consumed of each variety compensates households for the loss in environmental quality
associated with each unit of emission rights bought by the transport firm.
6. Gains from free trade reconsidered
To consider the conventional gains from trade net of the utility losses from pollution we
consider the difference between utility levels under free trade and under autarky using (1)
where we fill in the elements of the solution to the model:
Due to the symmetry assumption of the model we have nf = n*f. Using n*a = = 0 and
G ≡ U f U a n f (c fi )θ (n )f(c˜ fj )θ V(E f) [n a(c ai )θ (n )a(c˜ aj )θ V(E a)]
c˜
a
j
(3)-(5) the gains from trade can be written as:
Considering the case of no environmental payments, s = 0, we have nf = na, henceforth
G U f U a
n f [(c fi )θ (c˜ fj )θ] n a (c ai )θ V [E 2vn f (c˜ fj f c fi h) / K] V[E 2vn a c ai h / K]
abbreviated as n and for V(E) = E we find:
The first term contains the conventional gains from trade for the model with transport costs
G U f U a n [(c fi )θ (c˜ fj )θ (c ai )θ] 2vn (c˜ fj f c fi h c ai h) / K
and no environmental policy and the second the expected losses from the increased pollution
due to increased transport costs. Insertion of the values for n and the c-terms yields after some
manipulation (see appendix B, 6.):
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The first of the two terms in braces contains the conventional gains from trade which are
G L (1 θ) α 1
{( α θ/ϕ
1 θ
)θ
[1 (η/ϕ)θ / (1 θ)] [1 ( η
ϕ
)
θ
1 θ]θ
[η/ϕ (η/ϕ)1/(1 θ)]θ
2v { α θ / ϕ
1 θ
(η/ϕ) 1 / (θ 1) f h ( η
ϕ
)
θ
1 θ
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1 / (θ 1)
/K}
positive as θ < 1 and the second the expected losses from the increased pollution due to
increased transport costs which has the expected sign for f > h and θ < 1. As v does not
appear in η and ϕ, it does not appear in the formula for the conventional gains from trade.
This yields the following proposition;
PROPOSITION 10: If the pollution per unit of transport v is sufficiently high the
conventional gains from trade may be outweighed by the environmental losses from increased
transport pollution.
This result had already been derived by Pethig (1976) and Siebert (1977) but in a comparative
advantage model of perfect competition with pollution from output production under the
additional assumption that the country in question specializes in the environment-intensive
good.
Whether or not this is the case is clearly an empirical question, which we cannot
address here. Grossman and Krueger (1991) cast some doubt on the empirical relevance of
the shift to pollution-intensive production induced by trade. However, in this paper the result
is restated here for an extension of the Krugman model based on pollution from transport,
which does not depend on such a shift. Moreover, unlike Pethig’s result that trade has no
impact on pollution once environmental capital is fixed by an environmental standard, here
trade inevitably increases pollution because international transport differences are longer than
the national ones and transport is complementary to production and consumption.
Of course the assumption made in many trade policy circles, such as GATT or now
WTO, that the welfare gains from free trade will "automatically" provide the means for
payments to reduce pollution, are clearly subject to the same empirical evaluation because it
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ignores the pollution aspect of trade, i.e. the movement of goods through transport, itself.
7. Equilibrium prices for pollution rights
For s to be an equilibrium value the actual level of the environmental quality according to (5)
must be equal to the desired one according to (10) which requires formally:
or E = 0
(10’)V [ E v(tf uh) 2] λ s/v 0
In the latter case the household sells all emission rights because the return s is always higher
than marginal utility of the environment: s > vV’/λ.
The value of s in the first case is:
Insertion of values for n and the c terms delivers:
s v V [E v ( tf uh )2 ] / λ v V {E v2n [fc˜j hci ]/K } /λ
(10’’)
s v V { E v2


{[αθ/(1 θ)]/ϕ} [(β 2h/K d) (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)(β 2f/K d)]
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
α
1
L
[f
[ α θ
1 θ
/ϕ](η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
h [αθ/(1 θ)]/ϕ
η/ϕ (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)
]/K}
v V {E v2 L {[αθ/(1 θ)]/ϕ}{f (η/ϕ)
1/(θ 1) h]/K
{[αθ/(1 θ)]/ϕ}[(β 2h/K d) (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)(β 2f/K d)] }
v V {E v2 L {f (η/ϕ)
1/(θ 1) h}/K
[(β 2h/K d) (η/ϕ) 1/(θ 1)(β 2f/K d)] }
The argument in V’ contains the equilibrium level of environmental resources. The part
subtracted from is the equilibrium level of the environmental damage. As s is alsoE
contained in η and ϕ a solution of s can only be found for specifications of V(E). We
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consider three cases.
Firstly, the specification V(E) = E implies V’ = 1 and s ≥ v/λ. The equilibrium price
for pollution rights is v/λ or at s > v/λ > 0 the households sell all rights such that E = 0
because s > vV’/λ.
Secondly, the specification V(E) = Eθ and V’ = θ E(θ-1) is used. Here we must get the
internal solution of (10’), because for E = 0 marginal utility from the environment would go
to infinity. Therefore the household will always keep some rights.
Thirdly, we assume V(E) = ln E implying V’ = E-1 . As a result, and under the additional
simplifying assumption f = h, we get a non-unique equilibrium value for the tax/subsidy:
In the first term SQRT B is an abbreviation for the square root of some lengthy expression
s
± B
4 E f (θ 1)
βK
4f(θ 1)
dK
4f(θ 1)
v(θ 1 L θ)
E 2 (θ 1)
1
2(θ 1)
B. Only the second but last term is positive for L > 1 . If f, v and L are sufficiently large
then the sum of the last four terms is positive. Together with the negative SQRT B the
equilibrium tax is positive for high transport costs f, strong pollution v and a large market
expressed through high L if people value the environment sufficiently higher as its quality
decreases. A negative solution can be ruled out because again marginal utility would be at
infinity which induces households to keep some rights.
8. Optimal taxes and subsidies
The consideration of optimal taxes or subsidies is interesting for two reasons. For one,
because of the fact that equilibrium and optimal solutions to the environmental externality will
not be identical in this model because there is also a monopolistic inefficiency and because
the endogenous number of products exerts an externality on households. The literature
considering the deviation of optimal from equilibrium taxes/subsidies is of the partial
equilibrium type following Buchanan (1969). Two, after having shown in the previous section
that the existence of equilibrium taxes/subsidies may lead to a complete selling of
environmental rights, it is interesting to see which results follow from tax policy analysis.
Although there are three imperfections (the number of varieties is given to the households but
endogenous to the model, monopolistic prices deviate from marginal costs and there is no
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market for pollution rights) we use only one instrument, pollution taxes. The motivation is
that under zero profits governments will hardly interfere with monopoly and the variety
externality will supposedly be ignored as well.
Again we consider the three specifications given above. The solutions for the number
of varieties, domestic and imported consumption goods, are inserted into the utility function,
which is maximized with respect to the environmental tax/subsidy, s. We report the results
only.
For V(E) = E and V’ = 1 we find the optimal tax/subsidy as the implicit solution of:
Suppose s > 0, then f≥h and θ < 1 lead to a contradiction because all terms on the left side
[fhs (2 θ 2) β K (f h θ) dK (f h θ) fh (2 θ 2)]
[ 2hs β K dK 2h
2fs β K dK 2f ]
1/(θ 1) f 2 s(2θ 2) f (θ 1) (β K dK 2f) 0
of the equation are negative. Therefore we get the following proposition;
PROPOSITION 11: Under a linear utility function the tax s must be negative whereas it was
positive in the corresponding market equilibrium. The reason is that a positive tax would
decrease pollution and is likely to increase the number of varieties and therefore it also
increases the monopolistic inefficiency of prices deviating from marginal costs β. This latter
inefficiency is dominating with the specification at hand.
This is a general equilibrium formulation of Buchanan’s (1969) problem. Even if
environmental quality would go to zero, marginal utility is not increasing because of the
assumption of a linear utility function. The value of the environment is thus constant whereas
the value of the foregone consumption goods under a positive tax is increasing if consumption
is reduced and the monopolistic inefficiency is increased (decreased) by a positive (negative)
tax.
The simplest next step is again to give the environment the same elasticity of utility
as consumption, namely θ. This leads to the following proposition;
PROPOSITION 12: For V(E) = Eθ and V’ = θ Eθ-1, the case where no market equilibrium
existed in the previous section, we find an optimal tax/subsidy s = 0 for the simplification h
= f. For positive taxes the increase in the monopolistic inefficiency would more than outweigh
the sum of the environmental gains and the increase in utility through an increase in the
number of varieties.
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However, if f > h, an increase in environmental taxes, ds > 0, is likely to shift
transport services and demand from international to national transport. Therefore an optimal
subsidy may be positive for f > h.
The result of a tax at level zero for f = h may be viewed as counterintuitive in view
of the urgency of some environmental problems. Therefore we increase the marginal utility
of low values of environmental quality even further, assuming V(E) = ln E and V’ = E-1 . As
a condition for positivity of the optimal tax for f = h we now get:
To derive a condition for s > 0 we divide this expression by s 0, which yields the
{ E f s 2(4 θ2 8 θ 4) 2s(θ 1)[β E K d E K 2f (E L θ v)]} > 0
>
(<)
condition:
As the denominator is positive we find the following proposition;
s
>
(<)
2 (θ 1)[ β E K d E Kf 2 (E L θ v)]
E 4 (θ2 2 θ 1)
PROPOSITION 13: For sufficiently high values of the pollution coefficient v and the size
of the market L, the right side is positive and therefore a tax (s) will have to be positive as
it was under similar conditions in the market equilibrium considered in the previous section.
A growing economy which is captured through growth in L here requires a positive tax after
some time and growing taxation once the tax is positive7.
Generally speaking, positive optimal taxes require a utility function that is steeper in
the environmental part than in that of the quantities. Otherwise optimal taxes may be negative
or zero, because the monopolistic inefficiency is dominating. Unlike Buchanan (1969), we
derived the exact assumptions that are underlying these results in a general equilibrium
framework.
7 Sinclair (1992) argues that this may be an incentive to increase resource extraction in
the short run where producer prices for carbon fuel are high. We assume here that resource
extraction policy will not counteract international agreements to increase taxes and reduce
pollution.
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9. Conclusion
Since we have put the results in the form of propositions we do not summarize them again
here.
The policy results of our model depend strongly on peoples’ preferences for
environmental quality, which may be quite different among individuals, and on the severity
of pollution itself, which under imperfect information is highly subjective.
In our view the most interesting case in the model is the one where taxes on pollution
are positive because the underlying preferences seem to mirror the urgency of the
environmental problem more adequately. However, the main implication of our analysis, is
the relatively straightforward illustration that under ’realistic’ assumptions, the market solution
is not only necessarily non-optimal.
As illustrated in section 8, growing taxes on pollution seem to be a more reliable
general strategy towards optimal policy than any attempt to install "new pollution markets".
The latter will in the best case lead to a market equilibrium which will yield all the
"Pigovian" prices that have correctly been characterized by Buchanan as suboptimal.
This result is of course against economists’ intuition that markets do economize and allocate
better than governments. This intuition has, however, been formed under the impression of
traditional markets for which property rights had not to be established through the government
as is the case with pollution rights. Government action to distribute pollution rights and to
organize a market involves risks of both a market failure as well as government failure.
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